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Gerasimos Tsourapas
5 Why do states vary their policies towards their citizens abroad, and
AQ1
why are some
emigrant groups treated preferentially to others? The literature on the politics of
international migration has yet to explore this as a separate field of inquiry, assuming
that states adopt a single policy that encourages, sustains or prevents emigration
abroad. Yet, in the case of Egypt, the state developed a multi-tiered policy that distinctly
10 favoured specific communities abroad over others. I hypothesise that policy differen-
tiation is based upon the perceived utility of the emigrant group remaining abroad
versus the utility of its return. This utility is determined by two factors: the sending
state’s domestic political economy priorities and its foreign policy objectives.
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15 Introduction
What accounts for variation in a state’s policies towards its citizens abroad, and why
are some groups treated preferentially to others? The emerging academic literature on
the politics of international migration has yet to explore this phenomenon as a
separate field of inquiry and generally assumes that states adopt a single policy that
20 encourages, sustains or prevents emigration. Yet, in the case of Egypt, the state
developed a multi-tiered policy that distinctly favoured specific emigrant communit-
ies over others. This goes against existing theorisation of how states relate to their
emigrant populations in two ways. First, many scholars suggest that states develop
homogenous, one-tier policies aiming to encourage or to prevent emigration abroad.
25 However, through the Egyptian case, I demonstrate that states do not assume that all
citizens who migrate are equally important. So why should we expect them to develop
a single, all-encompassing policy? Second, the limited research on the rationale
behind differential state policies towards emigrants has yet to properly theorise the
importance of emigrants’ potential return to the homeland as a factor in determining
30 state engagement policy. Yet, the reasons behind state encouragement of citizens’
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emigration cannot be disassociated from the reasons behind state discouragement of
their potential return to the homeland and vice versa.
In this article, I explore state policy variation empirically in the case of Egypt to
shed light on states’ motivations in connecting to their emigrant populations residing
35 in different countries. I argue that states frequently develop multi-tiered policies that
favour specific emigrant communities over others, depending on these communities’
perceived utility abroad versus back home. I combine emigration and return
migration policies into the term ‘emigrant policies’ and argue that sending states
differentiate their emigrant policies towards emigrant communities based upon the
40 perceived utility of a community remaining abroad versus the utility of its potential
return. If the perceived utility of a population group abroad is positive, the sending
state is more likely to minimise its policy towards the group so as to avoid
antagonising the host state, to discourage return migration and to maximise the time
its emigrant group spends abroad. In contrast, if a group’s perceived utility abroad is
45 negative, the sending state creates a policy that actively aims to foster ties with the
group, to encourage its return and to minimise its time abroad. This utility is
determined by two factors: first, the sending state’s domestic political economy
priorities and, second, its foreign policy objectives.
This article focuses on Egypt for two reasons: first, Egypt constitutes the largest
50 supplier of migrant labour in the Middle East. It boasts one of the largest emigrant
populations in the world, estimated at 3.7 million in 2010 not including emigrants’
descendants. Second, Egyptian emigrant populations are widely dispersed across the
world and, importantly, Egypt exhibits wide variation in its treatment of emigrant
groups depending on their host country. This allows for a more accurate analysis of
55 within-state variation in policies towards emigrant groups located in different host
countries. Other sending states, such as Morocco or Mexico, enjoy larger numbers of
emigrant populations but they lack the geographical dispersal that occurs in the
Egyptian case.Moroccan emigrants are predominantly found in France, whileMexicans
abroad are located predominantly in North America. Thus, they lack any substantial
60 degree of engagement policy differentiation according to emigrants’ host country.
During the 1970–2011 period, two sets of policies evolved towards Egyptian
communities abroad.1 On the one hand, policy towards Egyptians in Europe, North
America and Australia was marked by diverse, institutionalised linkages with
emigrant communities, and was particularly inclusive: a variety of legal provisions,
65 annual conferences, complimentary trips to Egypt and a multitude of targeted
material issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs aimed to strengthen these emigrant
groups’ ties to the homeland. On the other hand, state policy towards Egyptians in
the Arab world was minimal and reactive. State mechanisms aiming to address
various issues evolved reluctantly, if at all; emigrants’ human rights were not
70 adequately protected, while ad hoc institutions arose out of the informal sector to fill
the void left by government neglect of the intra-Arab emigration process.
I employ the single-case study of Egypt for two reasons. First, a single-case study can
provide a challenge to existing theoretical paradigms, paving the way for future large-N
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studies. In this case, I argue that states develop multi-tier, rather than single-tier,
75 policies towards their emigrant groups that take into consideration both the utility of
the group abroad and the utility of its potential return to the homeland. The case of
Egypt also poses a challenge to conventional wisdom by indicating a counterintuitive
phenomenon: if an emigrant group is useful for a state abroad, the sending state is less
likely to invest in an extensive policy towards that group. Contrary to the majority of
80 relevant research, which argues that states engage diaspora and emigrant groups abroad
aiming to extract specific benefits from them, I utilise the Egyptian case to highlight
how a sending state is more likely to develop an extensive engagement policy towards a
group only when the latter stops serving state interests abroad. The Egyptian state, thus,
courted emigrants in North America and Europe despite their political opposition to
85 the ruling regime, rather than treating them as state ‘traitors’ as the literature would
have us expect.
Second, the single-case study format allows the introduction of detailed informa-
tion about the Egyptian case. In detailing how domestic political economy
considerations and foreign policy objectives shaped the Egyptian regime’s policies,
90 I seek to provide a fresh outlook into how Egypt’s position and perceived role in the
broader Middle East region is intrinsically tied to its ability to produce vast quantities
of emigrant labour. Thus, I aim to provide a more accurate account of the power
balances that shape intra-state relations across the Arab world. At the same time, I
show how Egypt’s post-1970 re-orientation towards the west created new, distinct
95 tensions within the ruling Egyptian regime and drew criticism for the loss of skilled
labour to Europe, Australia and North America. Beyond the importance of the
Egyptian case, I aim to make a broader argument that is of relevance for comparative
politics scholars of migration, detailing how states are able to control population
movements in their pursuit of domestic political economy and foreign policy goals.
100 I employ process-tracing methodology, where qualitative and quantitative data are
examined sequentially to draw descriptive inference and to disconfirm rival
explanations. I draw upon diverse primary and secondary material in Arabic,
French and English for the purpose of hypothesis formation through induction.
Primary materials are comprised of semi-structured expert and elite interviews
105 conducted in Cairo (n = 31), including current and former ministers, former Prime
Minister Abdel Aziz Hegazy and high-ranking government officials. I also draw upon
emigration-related articles published in the three major, semi-governmental daily
newspapers in Egypt (al-Ahram, al-Akhbar, al-Jumhuriya). Finally, I rely on archival
material in Cairo drawn from the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of
110 Manpower and Migration, and in London drawn from The National Archives.
Studying States’ Emigrant Policies
This section details how the now substantial literature on states’ relations to their
emigrant groups has yet to fully explore differential states’ policies as a separate object
of inquiry, and how we can draw from this literature in exploring and theorising the
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 3
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115 rationale behind such variation. I initially sketch the development of the literature’s
two broad phases, and I highlight how later researchers have identified both political
economy objectives and foreign policy priorities in understanding the rationale behind
states’ overall involvement with emigrant groups. I proceed to underline the need to
analytically disaggregate a state’s diaspora policies from those policies targeting
120 citizens who have emigrated or wish to do so. The latter is typically approached as part
of a state’s ‘emigration policy’, implying that research glosses over the importance of
emigrants’ potential return in shaping state rationale. Thus, I propose the term
‘emigrant policy’ as a more accurate description of state actions towards its external
populations. I conclude by proposing a theorisation of states’ differential treatment of
125 emigrant groups that builds on the two dimensions already developed in the literature
(their domestic political economy and foreign policy utility) but ascribes equal
importance to both groups’ emigration and their potential return.
The literature on the political importance of emigrant and diaspora groups has
undergone two broad phases, yet research has yet to sufficiently theorise why a state
130 would choose to differentiate its policy towards its emigrant populations. The
literature’s first phase suffered from a tendency to marginalise the role of the sending
state altogether. During the 1990s, early academic work on diaspora communities
provided a flexible framework through which scholars in sociology, political
geography and international relations studies debated post-national belonging
135 (Ragazzi 2014). This literature’s aim of exploring processes of emancipation from
the nation state implied that the latter, now ‘deterritorialised’ (Basch, Schiller, and
Blanc 1995), would take a secondary role in such analyses. Researchers focused on
transnational communities (Schiller et al. 1995), public spheres (Bauböck 1994 AQ2) and
novel processes of mobilisation (Ong 1996), which were perceived to ‘unbind’ the
140 nation state from territory. Thus, this early literature paid little attention to the state.
Weiner’s (1992) work, which argued for a focus on the role of governments in
migration through a ‘security/stability framework’, is a notable exception, even
though his attention centred on host states rather than sending ones. Overall,
however, this period’s perception of emigration was as a challenge to the primacy of
145 the state.
By the early 2000s, it had become clear that the nation state and ethnic politics was
still present in the strategies of many emigrant and diaspora groups (Adamson and
Demetriou 2013 AQ3), as groups abroad were correctly acknowledged as serving a
‘counterweight to the transnational perspective of migration’, for they offered a
150 ‘greater focus on the role of the state as an agent’ (Lafleur 2013, 9). This second wave
of research began to challenge the view that such population movements implied the
retreat of the state, mainly highlighting the developmental impact of such movements
for the sending state. Discrediting earlier ‘brain drain’ criticisms, exemplified in the
research of Bhagwati and others, such research was buttressed by growing
155 governmental and NGO attempts at incorporating emigrants into broader develop-
mental policies. A sizeable international political economy literature has since
indicated the importance of economic remittances for the sending state (indicatively:
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De Haas 2005), while a smaller research agenda highlights the foreign policy
importance of emigrant and diaspora groups (Délano 2011).
160 Two limitations of the second phase on state–diaspora relations literature are
pertinent here: first, the question of how and why states target different external
populations has not been sufficiently problematised. This is not to say that
researchers have disregarded differentiated state policies (see, for instance, Naujok’s
(2013 AQ4) work on India, Green and Weil’s (2007) anthology on emigration policies, or
165 Nyiri’s (2013) work on China), but that they have yet to theorise their political
rationale and purposes. Schmitter Heisler’s (1985) work on sending state policies, for
instance, acknowledges that states differentiate between ‘long-term-temporary’,
‘short-term-temporary’ and ‘permanent’ migration but employs this to argue that a
state ‘benefits [from migration] only if emigrants remain abroad for an extended
170 period without settling permanently’ (475). Levitt and de la Dehesa (2003) provide an
extensive analysis of sending states’ various engagement policies but do not account
for within-state variation, an argument that can be made with regard to Collyer’s
(2013) edited volume on the subject. Koinova’s (2012 AQ5) recent work on diaspora
‘positionality’ is a notable exception, but her focus remains on the agency of different
175 diaspora groups, rather than on sending state policies. Finally, for scholars of
economic remittances, states arguably have more incentives to reach out to wealthier
emigrant communities who can act as ‘agents of development’ (Eckstein and Najam
2013, 17), but such an argument would overstate states’ economic calculations at the
expense of political ones in promoting population movements (on this, see Greenhill
180 2011), while also understating the importance of south-south migration.
Second, this research has yet to effectively disaggregate the different types of
emigrants that state policies target. Within the emerging literature in political science,
in particular, the term diaspora suffers from a significant degree of conflation—often
encompassing not merely a state’s citizens who have emigrated, but also these
185 emigrants’ descendants, as well as other co-ethnics (cf. Brubaker 2005). Such
approaches prevent the proper classification and theorisation of state rationale
behind engagement policies, particularly when states target different groups in a
different manner. Gamlen’s (2008) study of the ‘emigration state’, for instance,
equates diasporas with ‘extra-territorial populations’, including:
190 temporary or transnational migrants who spread their time between their sending state
and elsewhere and fall more or less arbitrarily into one or other policy category of the
origin state. They also include longer-term but still first-generation emigrants settled in
another country, and descendants of emigrants who—in certain places at certain times—
identify as diasporic or even as members of a fully fledged diaspora ‘community’
195 (842–843).
Over the past few years, a growing literature successfully has eschewed such problems
of conflation by explicitly centring on state’s emigration, rather than diaspora,
policies. By avoiding discussion of state co-ethnics, this literature focuses exclusively
on state policies towards those who have emigrated with the intention of living
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 5
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200 abroad, and the reasons behind state engagement with emigrants correspond to the
findings of the state–diaspora relations literature, traditionally viewing ‘emigrants as a
resource that can be mobilised in support of the political or economic interests of
the sending state’ (Collyer 2013, 5; cf. Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). However, while
differentiating between state’s emigration and diaspora policies, this strand of
205 literature does not take into account the importance of emigrants’ potential return
as a shaping factor of state policy. As states frequently develop new institutional
mechanisms that target emigrant populations (Brand 2006), they build ties not solely
with emigrants, but also with prospective emigrants (Rodriguez 2013 AQ6) as well as with
return migrants (Tsuda 2009; Fitzgerald 2014). This points to an important, albeit
210 un-problematised, aspect of states’ policies towards its emigrants, namely the
interconnectedness of emigration and return. ‘Return movements across time and
space have largely been ignored in anthropology and migration research’, Stefansson
(2004, 3) argued. While sociologists and historians have amended this gap (Levitt
1998 AQ7; Khater 2001), Stefansson’s argument remains true within political science. The
215 literature on diaspora acknowledges that diaspora policies often aim to attract groups
of co-ethnics back to the homeland, but the literature on emigration policy has not
taken that into account. Put differently, a state’s policy of encouraging or
discouraging its citizens’ emigration is connected to its respective discouragement,
or encouragement, of its citizens’ return migration.
220 In sum, I draw upon existing literature in two ways. First, I rely upon state–
diaspora relations research to explain how states connect to their populations abroad
in a broadly instrumental fashion, aiming to attain distinct political economy and
foreign policy goals. Yet, I differentiate between state policies towards diaspora
groups in general, and policies towards emigrant groups, on which I focus in this
225 article. Second, I rely on the growing literature on states’ emigration policy but I aim
to combine both emigration and return migration policy into a state’s ‘emigrant
policy’, utilising research in sociology and history that sees the interconnectedness
between migration and return. Thus, in my theorisation, a state’s emigrant policy
encompasses both its emigration and return migration policy but is altogether
230 different from its diaspora policy in two ways: it does not target all co-ethnics, rather
state citizens who have emigrated, and it aims at distinct domestic political economy
and foreign policy goals.
I hypothesise that the degree of a state’s engagement with an emigrant community
depends primarily upon the perceived utility of the community remaining abroad
235 versus the utility of a potential return. In other words, if the perceived utility of a
population group abroad is positive (i.e. greater abroad than back home), the sending
state is more likely to minimise its engagement policies towards that group. In
contrast, if a group’s perceived utility abroad is negative (i.e. greater back home than
abroad), the sending state would create a policy that actively aims to foster ties and
240 encourage the group’s return. This utility is determined by two broad factors: first,
the sending state’s domestic political economy priorities and, second, its foreign
policy objectives.
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Egypt’s Differentiated Emigrant Policies
In this section, I identify the two sets of emigrant policies developed by the Egyptian
245 state, I evaluate the two existing hypotheses that have been put forth to account for
this policy differentiation and propose an alternative one. Already in its first attempt
at institutionalising such a policy, in 1971, the Egyptian state made the legal
distinction between ‘permanent’ and ‘temporary’ emigration. Article 52 of the 1971
Permanent Constitution listed ‘permanent’ and ‘temporary’ emigration as an
250 Egyptian citizen’s right. Law 111/1983, still valid today, explains the difference
between the two: a ‘permanent’ emigrant is one who ‘stays abroad permanently by
obtaining the nationality of a foreign country and/or a permanent residence permit;
stays abroad for a period of at least ten years; or obtains an immigration permit from
one of the countries of destination’. A ‘temporary’ emigrant, on the other hand, is
255 ‘someone (not a student or seconded worker) who works abroad for twelve
consecutive month AQ8s’ (Figures 1 and 2).
However, in practice, this differentiation has been based upon country of
destination: Egyptians living in Arab countries are invariably considered temporary
emigrants, even when they have lived there for decades. All those emigrating
260 elsewhere, on the other hand, are considered permanent emigrants, even if they just
arrived in their host countries (Zohry and Harrell-Bond 2003). The literature has
accounted for this citing foreign workers’ inability to settle permanently in the
countries of the Arab Gulf and the relative ease of doing so in the west. Yet, this is not
entirely accurate. Not all regional emigration is de facto temporary: Syria, Jordan and
265 Libya, which constitute traditional destinations of Egyptian migrants in the Arab
world, have, at times, granted citizenship to emigrants, particularly to Arabs (Dib
1979 AQ9). But even in the countries of the Persian Gulf, it is not unusual for Egyptian
migrants to remain there for over two or three decades or, even, to stay abroad until
their death. Thus, given that the ‘transformation of temporary immigrants into
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Kuwait United Arab Emirates Other Arab Countries
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Figure 1. Distribution of Egyptian emigrants in Arab countries by host country (%).
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270 settlers cannot be ruled out’ in the Gulf (Kapiszewski 2001, 193), the Egyptian state’s
decision to bifurcate its engagement policy merits deeper analysi AQ10s (Table 1).
The differentiation between ‘permanent’ and ‘temporary’ emigrants resulted in a
two-tiered emigrant policy. The former were courted by the state: a large number of
them would frequently be invited back to Cairo and Alexandria, where they would be
275 entertained by the President and the First Lady under both the administrations of both
Presidents Sadat (al-Jumhuriya, 4 August 1976) and Mubarak (al-Ahram, 2 August
2010). In the aftermath of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, about 1500 emigrants fromNorth
America would receive annual tours of the Suez war front hosted by various cabinet
ministers (al-Ahram, 17 June 1974; al-Jumhuriya, 27 August 1976). ‘Permanent’
280 emigrants enjoyed heightened attention of the executive and state agencies abroad:
those studying in Europe and North America would receive financial support from the
Egyptian President on an ad hoc basis—a grant of $50,000, or ~$212,000 today, was
given to the Union of Egyptian students in North America, for instance (al-Ahram,
9 August 1976), while any problems were to be dealt with immediately, regardless of
285 cost. At one point, Sadat even had the Presidential airplane transport home Egyptians
who had been unable to find employment in France (al-Jumhuriya, 12 July 1975).
In sharp contrast, the Egyptian state was less active in cementing the relationship
between ‘temporary’ Egyptian emigrants to the Arab world and their homeland
(Lesch 1985 AQ11). The state’s initial involvement in regulating the outflow of Egyptian
290 labour towards the Arab world, by coordinating requests from Arab and, to a lesser
extent, African states, gradually diminished: by the 1990s, the unregulated makatib
al-tawzị̄f (non-governmental recruitment agencies) would court Arab employers who
United States Canada Italy
Australia Greece Holland
39%
13%11%
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Figure 2. Distribution of Egyptian emigrants in Western countries by host country (%).
Source: International organization for migration (2010).
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had travelled to Egypt to secure contracts for Egyptian workers. The agencies then
sold these contracts at exorbitant prices to Egyptians. Currently, a work permit for
295 Saudi Arabia is priced at 20,000 EGP (~$2600), while a permit for Kuwait goes for
30,000 EGP (~4000). A multitude of bilateral and multilateral treaties signed with
Arab states that aimed to regulate the outflow of Egyptian labour were never
observed, and the stipulated migration quotas never enforced.
Two main hypotheses have been put forth to account for this divergence in Egypt’s
300 emigration policy. According to the first hypothesis, the state lacks the administrative
and financial capacity to cater to the needs of its extensive diaspora in the Arab world
(e.g. Lesch 1985 AQ12) and prefers to leave matters to ‘private initiative’ (Choucri 1977 AQ13, 11).
When interviewed, state policy-makers and elites have apologetically argued that it
was not possible to extend the same policies to the millions working in the Arab
305 world as to the smaller and more manageable Egyptian emigrant population in the
west. However, this argument is unconvincing. Despite its alleged financial and
infrastructural limitations, the state still chose to cater to a specific group of Egyptians
abroad over another. Furthermore, in the pre-1973 period, emigrants to the west
outnumbered regional emigrants, yet state policy has courted ‘permanent’ migrants
310 from 1971 onwards. Which factors determined the deliberate targeting ‘permanent’
emigrants at the expense of ‘temporary’ ones?2
The second hypothesis points to the cyclical nature of Egyptians’ regional
migration as an explanatory factor for policy variation: regional migration tends to
be temporary, and therefore state investment in such emigrant groups is less
315 important than catering to emigrants in the west. When I interviewed the 2014
Minister of Migration and Manpower, Nahed Ashri, she told me: ‘Egyptians in the
Arab world are not migrants. They are temporary workers, who will return home’.
Former Minister of Health and president of Cairo University Ismail Gamil Badran
Table 1. Number of Egyptian emigrants according to host country.
Host country Number of emigrants
Austria 14,000
France 36,000
Germany 25,000
Greece 60,000
Italy 90,000
Netherlands 40,000
Spain 12,000
UK 35,000
Australia 70,000
Canada 110,000
Switzerland 14,000
USA 318,000
Total in the west 824,000
Total in the Arab World 1,685,879
Source: International organization for migration (2010).
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 9
c:/3b2win/temp files/CJMS_A_1049940_O_ANN.3d 16th June 2015 18:1:55
   
informed me that the Egyptian state’s emigration policy ‘targeted the sons of Egypt
320 abroad, not Egyptians in the Gulf’. Put bluntly, why would the state expend resources
in fostering ties with emigrant groups who will, overall, eventually return to the
homeland on their own? This hypothesis, implicit in much of the early literature on
Middle Eastern migratory movements (Birks and Sinclair 1979), points to a more
accurate understanding of state policy yet remains under-theorised. Is there a ranking
325 in terms of the emigrant groups targeted by the Egyptian state and, if so, what
determines this hierarchy? According to the hypothesis put forth in the previous
section, an explanation of Egypt’s development of differentiated emigrant policies can
be explained below.
Egyptian Emigrant Policies and Domestic Political Economy Considerations
330 ‘I am not opposed to migration, as we are a nation of 45 million people’
(Hosni Mubarak, 26 February 1983).
This section will examine evidence for the hypothesis that domestic political economy
considerations have influenced the development of Egypt’s policy with regard to both
‘permanent’ and ‘temporary’ emigration. The state’s proactive policy towards
335 Egyptians residing in Europe and North America can be understood through the
domestic political economy priorities of Presidents Sadat (1970–1981) and Mubarak
(1981–2010). One of Sadat’s first policy decisions was the expulsion of Soviet advisors
from Egypt as he attempted to liberalise the Egyptian economy and place it within the
Western sphere of influence (Beattie 2000). His well-documented belief that the
340 solution to Egypt’s economic woes lies in liberalisation, Western knowledge transfer,
and a re-alignment with the USA was reflected in the state’s emigration policy, and
the systematic courting of Egyptians in Europe and North America. The faith Sadat
placed in these emigrants is apparent by the fact that, just before the massive 1977
‘Bread Riots’, he ‘asked Egyptian scientists abroad to participate in solving Egypt’s
345 food and housing crisis’ (al-Ahram, 5 January 1977), much as he had sought their
expertise when presenting his plans to liberalise the Egyptian economy (al-Ahram, 21
April 1974). This extended to public pleas for these emigrants to ‘contribute
materially’ to the homeland’s development (al-Ahram, 28 February 1977). The belief
that ‘permanent’ emigrants will aid in the country’s development is further
350 documented in the themes of the bi-annual, state-sponsored conferences organised
through the ‘Friends of Egypt’ organisation. The target of these events was Egyptians
residing in Western countries, according to organiser Dr Badran, and the professed
aim was to ‘bring successful Egyptians back to the homel AQ14and’ (Table 2).
Thus, as the perceived domestic political economy utility of this population group
355 abroad was negative for the Egyptian state, the latter subsequently developed an
extensive emigrant policy aiming to ensure Egyptians’ return to the homeland.
A central aim of the policies and broader discourse that the state developed was the
return of these emigrants, targeting them from the early stages of their emigration.
While the acquisition, or upgrading, of skills was seen as beneficial by the state, it was
10 G. Tsourapas
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360 ultimately overshadowed by the assumption that these migrants would not return. As
Sadat stated, ‘a considerable number of Egyptian scientists work abroad. Some have
attained extremely high levels of education, and there is no objection to having them
come back to contribute to the country’s scientific development. With their experience
acquired abroad, those scientists could offer much’ (al-Akhbar, 11 October 1971).
365 State policy extended beyond mere financial incentives (for instance, beneficial
access to housing), or the ad hoc creation of ‘Visiting Professor’ posts in universities
to be occupied by Egyptian scientists residing abroad (al-Ahram, 21 April 1974). The
degree to which the Egyptian state wanted their return was evident from the decision
to grant legal amnesty to ‘permanent’ emigrants for past offences. Under Nasser,
370 many middle-class families had sent their sons to Europe and North America to
avoid mandatory military conscription, both before and after the 1967 War. By the
early 1970s, these emigrants were unable to return to Egypt, where they would face
persecution. As former Minister of Youth (1999–2004) Ali E. Hillal Dessouki recalled,
President Sadat decided to grant a general amnesty to all Egyptians who had escaped
375 conscription and dispatched military attachés abroad inviting the emigrants back to
Egypt.
The perceived utility of such ‘permanent’ emigrants, and the desire to bring them
back home, was evident in their descriptions by the mainstream Egyptian media.
Indicatively:
380 Egypt’s youthful skills have stolen the limelight and come to be the country’s staple
crop. Some of them get higher salaries than Dr. Henry Kissinger while still in their
forties. Some lead the same lavish life as Hollywood stars. They own villas with fragrant
gardens and as many as three cars each. One of them travels by private helicopter from
his country home to his place of work inside New York! But our country will not lose
385 the brains we export to the outside world. For a successful Egyptian must be back home
one day to drink again from the Nile and to live with the generous people [of Egypt]. An
Egyptian travels but does not go for good, for he always returns (al-Akhbar,
30 June 1975).
Why was this proactive policy not extended to the ‘temporary’ Egyptian emigrants
390 across the Arab world? As per my hypothesis, these emigrants’ perceived domestic
political economy utility abroad was positive for two reasons. First, their emigration
was a solution to Egypt’s chronic problems of unemployment and overpopulation
and, second, they provided extensive financial support to Egypt through remittances.
In terms of the former, my interviewees invariably pointed out that regional
395 emigrants have historically been mostly low- and medium-skilled workers. Tempor-
ary emigration was considered the ‘safety valve’ that would relieve the two major
burdens of Egypt’s domestic economy, overpopulation and unemployment: Former
Prime Minister Hegazy (1974–1975) informed me that Nasser had entrusted him,
already in 1968, with introducing policies that would allow Egypt to ‘export’ its excess
400 labour to neighbouring countries. By 1975, Prime Minister Mamdouh Salem declared
that emigration was the official target of the nation (al-Akhbar, 15 August 1975).
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 11
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Thus, prospective emigrants to the Arab world were not regarded as an asset by the
state: ‘We should view the millions of Egyptians remaining in the country as a
burden’, writes journalist and writer Anis Mansour, ‘which we should reduce by
405 having them emigrate or exported’ (al-Akhbar, 9 April 1975). ‘At least a partial
solution, a way of easing the pressure’, confessed Egypt’s Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs Boutros-Ghali (1977, 1978–1979), is ‘for Egypt to ‘export’ Egyptians to other
Arab nations’ (Washington Post, 27 January 1982).
Additionally, regional emigrants’ remittances further underlined the positive utility
410 of this group abroad for the Egyptian state. Regional emigrants’ remittances have
always vastly exceeded those from the west in the aftermath of the 1973 crisis. By
1977, the Egyptian Government put forth its five-year economic plan predicting as
much as 350 million EGP in net returns from incomes abroad. According to data
from the Egyptian Central Bank, in the early 1990s migrants’ remittances accounted
415 for over 14% of its GDP. These remittances originate chiefly from Egyptians
employed in the Arab world: according to the most recent available data, remittances
from workers in Saudi Arabia accounted for 42.7% of net private transfers to Egypt in
2012, followed by Kuwait (21.3%) and the United Arab Emirates AQ15(12.2%; Figures 3
and 4).
420 I hypothesise that, given their perception as an asset to Egypt’s domestic political
economy abroad, the state chose to discourage regional emigrants’ return to the
homeland by minimising its emigrant policy towards them and favouring ‘perman-
ent’ emigrants instead. In sharp contrast to the state’s wish for the return of
emigrants from North America and Europe, a mass return of Egyptians working in
Table 2. AQ29‘Friends of Egypt’ conference titles.
Year Conference titles
1974 Organising modes of communication with Egyptian scholars abroad
1976 Development of the desert
1978 Development of the countryside as a source of complete development
1980 Development under the umbrella of peace
1982 The role of science and technology in Egyptian development
1984 Environmental problems of development
1986 Economic development in Egypt
1988 Education in Egypt
1990 Egypt’s human resources
1992 Water resources and development in Egypt
1994 Energy and continuous development in Egypt
1996 Unemployment in Egypt
1998 Development of the desert in the third millennium
2001 Modernising Egypt
2003 Human development in the third millennium
2005 Information technology and its role in development
2009 Care, communication and development
Source: Ibrahim Gamil Badran (President of ‘Friends of Egypt’ Organization; Minister of Health, 1976–1978;
President, 1978–1980, Cairo University), Personal Interview. Cairo, Egypt; 21 Jan. 2014.
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425 the Arab countries would constitute a tremendous socio-economic problem for the
Egyptian state. When Libya’s Gadhafi expelled thousands of Egyptians in 1977, the
state scrambled to provide accommodation and nourishment for the returnees, let
alone new employment opportunities (al-Akhbar, 10 May 1977). I frequently
encountered the fear in Egyptian policy-making circles that a potential return of
430 regional migrants would disturb the flow of remittances to the state. In the early
1990s, the regime’s support of Kuwait in the Iraq War resulted in Saudi Arabia
‘rewarding’ Mubarak by not deporting the thousands of Egyptians working in the
Kingdom who continued to send back much-needed remittances (Van Hear 1998 AQ16).
The counterintuitive nature of my hypothesis (that a state does not expand capital
435 towards its most ‘valuable’ emigrant group abroad) might suggest that this was a
policy miscalculation on behalf of the Egyptian state or a case of path dependence: by
the time the Egyptian state realised that regional emigrants were able to send an
unprecedented level of remittances back to the homeland, Egypt’s policy had been
established to provide for ‘permanent’ emigrants rather than ‘temporary’ ones. Thus,
440 Law 111/1983, which ensconced this policy differentiation, should be seen as a case of
policy entrenchment: the cost of switching to a new policy would have been
extremely high, despite regional migrants’ high domestic political utility. Yet, there is
no evidence of any serious debate on such a policy shift. Furthermore, within a state
governed by a non-democratic regime, such as Egypt’s, the executive is much freer to
445 shape state policy to its demands. The opportunity cost of switching emigrant policy
(a ‘low-policy’, by most accounts) would not have been exorbitant. The validity of this
paper’s hypothesis will become clearer in the following section, which explains how
foreign policy objectives determine an emigrant group’s utility.
Egyptian Emigrant Policies and Foreign Policy Imperatives
450 I do not oppose emigration to highly developed countries for the purposes of becoming
acquainted with the latest technological advances […] As for Egyptian emigration to
Arab and African states Egypt will continue to meet the manpower requirements of
these countries (Anwar Sadat, 5 January 1977).
This section will examine how Egypt’s differentiated policy served the state’s foreign
455 policy directives under the Sadat and Mubarak regimes. On the one hand, the utility
of ‘permanent’ emigrants in terms of Egypt’s foreign policy was perceived as negative:
not only did they represent the country’s ‘brain drain’, they frequently criticised the
Egyptian regime through the media and various protests, tarnishing the regime’s
‘democratising’ image abroad and its rapprochement with the USA. I hypothesise that,
460 given that ‘permanent’ emigrants were not seen as useful abroad for the state’s foreign
policy, Egypt fostered their return. On the other hand, ‘temporary’ migration
maintained Egypt’s regional relevance after the Six Day War of 1967 and mitigated
the effects of Egypt’s isolation following the 1979 Peace Treaty with Israel. Therefore,
as the utility of ‘temporary’ emigrants was perceived as positive, policy towards them
465 was minimal. The state was unwilling to risk this steady outflow by pressuring for
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better human rights protection or improved working rights for these emigrants. It
merely maintained an outflow of labour to the region and discouraged emigrants’
return.
Until the late 1960s, modern Egypt’s foreign relations had been marked by Nasser’s
470 emphasis on the ‘positive neutrality’ doctrine of non-alignment, on a cautious
relationship with the Soviet Union, and on antagonism towards the oil-rich countries
of the Arab world, namely Saudi Arabia (Kerr 1971). The state’s foreign policy
underwent a radical shift as the centre of Arab power shifted away from Egypt
towards the oil-rich countries of the Persian Gulf in the aftermath of the Six Day War
475 and, even more heavily, following the 1973 War (Korany and Dessouki 2008). The
distrust that Nasser exhibited towards both the USA and Egypt’s regional Arab
neighbours was reversed under Sadat, despite his signing of the 1979 peace treaty
with Israel, which was ill-received by the Arabs. The Egyptian state’s pro-American
and pro-Saudi orientation was further solidified under Mubarak. Overall, emigrant
480 policy complemented Egypt’s new foreign policy strategies of rapprochement towards
both the oil-rich countries of the Arab world and the USA.
I hypothesise that the perceived foreign policy utility of ‘permanent’ emigrants was
negative for two reasons: first, emigrants to the ‘west’ were traditionally perceived as
%
4%
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16%
1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010
Figure 3. Personal remittances received, 1977–2011 (% of Egypt’s GDP).
Source: Author’s compilation (Central Bank of Egypt data).
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the core of the state’s ‘brain drain’ issue (al-Akhbar, 27 October 1978). Statistical data
485 on Egyptian migrants’ levels of education in each host state are unavailable, but the
dominant perception of state elites in Egypt remains that ‘as far as permanent
migration to more developed countries is concerned, this has always mainly
interested more educated workers’ (Talani 2009, 184); while skilled Egyptian labour
did emigrate across the region, the literature agrees that ‘brain drain’ occurred mainly
490 to the west and, particularly, towards the USA and Canada (Zohry and Harrell-Bond
2003, 47–48). Not only did they detract from Egypt’s image of a stable country (an
image that Presidents Sadat and Mubarak were eager to present to the outside world),
they were perceived as smearing it, by pinpointing Egypt’s inability to provide
employment opportunities for its educated citizens. Many government officials I
495 interviewed considered such emigration a ‘taboo’ that should not be discussed, lest it
somehow reveal a version of Egypt that was far from perfect. Interestingly, Egyptians
residing in the west have been perceived as more susceptible to Israeli influence—the
media frequently published stories of Israel attempting to recruit Egyptian youth
abroad. In the case of one Egyptian abroad, ‘the Israeli intelligence who is always
500 watching for [Egyptians] to recruit for work, was ready for him and flooded him with
money, women, and red nights’ (al-Jumhuriya, 30 November 1975). While such
reports are frequently exaggerated, they nonetheless reveal the state’s loss of control
over ‘permanent’ emigrants.
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Figure 4. Personal remittances to Egypt by emigrants’ host country (% of total).
Source: Author’s compilation (Central Bank of Egypt and World Bank data).
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Second, the perceived utility of Egyptians in the ‘west’ was also affected by
505 emigrants’ public protests, media campaigns or other attempts at drawing attention
to the authoritarian nature of the Egyptian ruling regime. I do not argue that all
Egyptians were politically active nor that pro-regime activism was unheard of. In fact,
Sadat frequently employed the support of ‘permanent’ emigrants for his regime, for
instance by producing telegrams that expatriates in Europe and North America had
510 sent to Sadat or Mubarak, expressing their enthusiasm for the regime’s political
programme and publishing them in the press. On 21 April 1974, for instance, al-
Akhbar details how, in their cable, ‘expatriates thanked the President for meeting
them and speaking to them as well as for his obvious care for them. They also greeted
the President and pledged allegiance to their great people’. Through such acts, he
515 hoped to gain both domestic and international points, mainly from Washington. One
example was the August 1977 Conference of Egyptian students in North America, for
which 70 Egyptian students were flown to Cairo on President Sadat’s private airplane
for the two-week event. Reported on all three major newspapers was a cable the
students sent to Sadat:
520 Addressing President Sadat as a father, the cable said that, on approaching the air strip
of their dear fatherland, they would like to express sincere thanks and gratitude for
honouring them by providing them with the opportunity to visit their dear Egypt and
mother country aboard the President’s private plane. The cable said that the President
has always acted like that (9 August 1977).
525 Yet, anti-Sadat and anti-Mubarak protests quickly overshadowed such pro-regime
actions. Once Egyptians in Europe and North America began voicing their
dissatisfaction with Presidents Sadat and Mubarak, the regime was no longer able
to argue that it enjoyed expatriates’ support, in domestic or international politics.
Such protests tarnished the image of Egypt abroad even more than the ‘brain drain’
530 issue, given the emphasis that both Sadat and Mubarak placed on their perception in
the west. One of the most prominent protests was staged during Sadat’s final visit to
Washington in 1981, after which the President jailed about 1500 perceived political
opponents in Egypt.
Given the negative net utility of ‘permanent’ emigrants to the foreign policy
535 directives of the Egyptian state, emigrant policy was shaped in such a way as to co-
opt them. For Egyptians studying in Britain, for instance, Sadat offered ‘eleven
pilgrimage tickets, an Islamic library of 2000 volumes and a large number of recorded
recitations of the Qur’an’ (al-Jumhuriya, 12 May 1974). On the occasion of the
aforementioned visit of North American Egyptian students to Cairo, Sadat had the
540 Ministry of Information ‘offer 6000 EGP to consolidate the budget of the Egyptian
Student Union in the United States and Canada’ (al-Jumhuriya, 12 August 1977).
Such symbolic efforts were utilised to put forth an image of Egypt that corresponded
to the foreign policy demands of the time—a politically liberal state that cared for its
citizens in the west.
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545 On the other hand, the utility of ‘temporary’ emigrants for Egypt’s foreign policy
was perceived as extremely positive. This is attributed to two factors: first, regional
emigration allowed Egypt to maintain its regional relevance in the aftermath of the
Six Day War; and second, it mitigated the effects of Egypt’s isolation following the
1979 Peace Treaty with Israel. In terms of the former, President Sadat employed
550 Egypt’s potential as a provider of labour to the Arab world heavily in his foreign
policy. As early as 1973, he highlighted the continuing importance of Egypt as the
region’s most populous country in terms of its contribution to the wars against Israel.
Egyptian officials argued that it was not merely the oil embargo that played an
integral part in the 1973 War but also Egypt’s ‘enormous’ sacrifices in terms of
555 manpower. ‘Egypt’, prominent journalist Musa Sabry wrote in al-Akhbar, ‘is the
Arabs’ fortress; she has sacrificed 100,000 martyrs over 4 wars’. Once hostilities
ended, and oil-rich Arab countries began to employ the vast profits of the oil price
rises for their modernisation and industrialisation programmes, Sadat signalled that
Egypt’s abundant manpower was now ready to be deployed to service the needs of its
560 Arab neighbours. By the end of the decade, Egypt’s role as a regional supplier of
labour had ‘become a tradition’ (Birks 1978 AQ17, 12).
In terms of Egypt’s foreign policy, it enabled a gradual rapprochement between
Sadat’s regime and the oil-rich countries, enshrined in the numerous, frequently
overlapping agreements signed between Egypt and other Arab states (see Table 3),
565 where development projects were heavily reliant on large numbers of foreign workers.
As mentioned above, the stipulations of these intra-state agreements were rarely
followed. In fact, in an interview, longtime Minister of Manpower and Migration
(2006–2011, 2014–), Aisha Abdel-Hady, admitted she was unaware of many of these
treaties’ content (which is typically not made public) or, even, their existence. This is
570 not surprising given that Egyptian state officials have often admitted that regional
migration processes are so complex and they cannot be effectively regulated in intra-
state accords. Thus, one can only surmise that the multiple, overlapping agreements
signed with host states were aimed more at solidifying Egypt’s position within the
Arab world, rather than at regulating regional emigration.
575 At the same time, the country’s newfound comparative advantage as a source of
migrant labour was used by Egypt to end its post-1979 foreign policy regional
isolation. The aftermath of the 1979 Peace Treaty with Israel, one of the most
controversial decisions of Egyptian foreign policy, saw Egypt regionally isolated.
Despite the economic embargo imposed on Egypt by Arab states and the freezing of
580 the country’s membership of the League of Arab States, Egyptian emigrants remained
across the region, softening the blow to the Egyptian economy. Following Sadat’s
death, Mubarak continued to support Egyptian emigration across the Arab world and
further signed a number of additional bilateral agreements on the issue (as seen in
Table 3), as part of his policy of restoring Egypt’s regional position.
585 Therefore, it was in the Egyptian state’s best interest to continue sending emigrants
across the region. The state’s emigrant policy was shaped accordingly: the emphasis
on the ‘temporary’ aspect of such migration aimed to mollify Arab countries’
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misapprehensions about opening their borders to millions of Egyptian migrants. In
the 1950s and 1960s, reports of Egyptians abroad spreading Nasserite ideology and
590 disseminating propaganda material in their host states were frequent across the Arab
world, from Libya and Algeria to Syria and Yemen, and even more so in the Gulf
states. Arab states’ distrust of Nasser’s propaganda machine and the disturbing
political effects of Egyptian immigration are well documented (Tsourapas 2015b).
Sadat was able to overcome host states’ objections by discursively presenting post-
595 1970 migration as de-politicised, driven by economic rather than ideological reasons
and, above all, ‘temporary’.
Sadat asserted that the Egyptian state abroad would no longer support Egyptian
migrants’ interference in the political scene of other Arab states. According to Anis
Mansour:
600 [A]n Egyptian was looked upon as the man with the ‘ugly face’ throughout the Arab
world. For twenty years, every Egyptian had seemed to turn into a spy or saboteur.
Every Egyptian teacher was thought to have come to overthrow the standing rule and to
distribute subversive literature. Every Egyptian doctor was considered a spy acting for
Egyptian Intelligence Service to set one class against another. […] Now he is not
605 interested in other peoples’ own affairs. ‘Give and take’ is his motto (al-Akhbar, 13
March 1974).
Emigrants’ de-politicisation was combined with the ‘temporary’ nature of their stay,
in order to further appease the host states’ concerns and ensure a continuing demand
for Egyptian labour. The state’s position that these Egyptians were by no means’
610 emigrants but temporary workers who would return in a few years (as stated above)
should be seen in this light. As Ali Amin wrote:
Egypt will never think of interfering with the internal affairs of any Arab state. Neither
will it impose an opinion, a certain person, policy, or form of government on them, be it
Beirut, Amman, Damascus, Tripoli, Kuwait, or the Arabian Gulf. Every Arab people has
615 come of political age […] Sadat believes Arab nationalism does not mean the imposition
by Egypt of its own views but rather that it should bow to every Arab people’s own
choice’ (al-Ahram, 7 April 1974).
As a result of their professed political neutrality, Egyptian workers were commonly
preferred over Palestinians or Yemenis, who were considered agitators.
620 Overall, the expansive emigrant policy towards Egyptians in the ‘west’ can be
comprehended in light of their negative utility abroad. In the case of regional
migration, Egypt’s minimal policy further reflected the power asymmetries within the
Middle East and between host and sending states in general. While it initially appears
counterintuitive that an emigrant group with high foreign policy utility enjoyed only
625 minimal support from the sending state, such a policy ensured that host states would
continue to demand, and employ, Egyptian labour. Egyptian emigrant labour
continued to be attractive partly due to the absence of the state’s involvement in its
affairs, refusing to intervene even at instances of human rights violations. When
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Libya, for instance, in early August 1977, expelled thousands of Egyptian engineers,
630 lawyers and workers, the Egyptian state responded in a lacklustre manner. The extent
of Egyptians’ plight in Libya was consistently underplayed ( AQ18Tsourapas 2015a). Any
potential attempt at protesting against human rights abuses or pressuring for better
working conditions for Egyptians in the Arab world was out of the question, if Egypt
wanted to maintain a steady outflow of emigrant workers.
635 By identifying the domestic political economy and foreign policy determinants of
Egypt’s emigrant policy, I have outlined a case of distinct policy bifurcation that is
unique from other states that typically receive scholarly attention, rendering the
Egyptian example internationally relevant. How does this theorisation travel beyond
the Egyptian case? In Japan, the negative utility of emigrants and their descendants in
640 Latin America during the late 1980s (perceived as offering little to the state from
abroad, both in terms of political economy and foreign policy-wise at times of
massive Japanese manpower needs) led to a proactive emigrant policy that attracted
thousands of emigrants, or nikkeijin, back to Japan (Yamanaka 1996). Once the
recent financial slowdown in Japan highlighted the potential positive utility of these
645 groups abroad, the Japanese state not only did away with this proactive emigrant
policy but is offering ¥300,000 to those willing to emigrate back to Latin America.
Similar distinctions have evolved in other major migrant sending states—such as
India, which distinguishes between persons of Indian origin (PIOs) and non-resident
Indians (NRIs) (Naujoks 2013).
Table 3. Emigration-related agreements (treaties, memoranda of under-
standing and protocols) between Egypt and Arab states, 1971–2011.
Year Countries
1971 Egypt–Libya
1972 Egypt–Algeria
1974 Egypt–Jordan
1974 Egypt–Qatar
1975 Egypt–Iraq
1981 Egypt–Jordan
1985 Egypt–Jordan
1985 Egypt–Iraq
1993 Egypt–Iraq
1993 Egypt–Lebanon
1993 Egypt–United Arab Emirates
1994 Egypt–United Arab Emirates
1994 Egypt–Libya
1997 Egypt–Yemen
1998 Egypt–Lebanon
2001 Egypt–Tunisia
2003 Egypt–Sudan
2007 Egypt–Jordan
2007 Egypt–Saudi Arabia
2009 Egypt–Libya
Source: Author’s compilation.
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650 Conclusion
States do not assume that all citizens who emigrate are equally important. Why
should one assume that their emigration and diaspora policies are homogenous?
Empirically, multi-tier emigration policies exhibit variation by age, sex, educational
level and occupation status. The tentative data from Egypt presented here indicate
655 that there is within-state variation in policy according to emigrants’ host country. My
hypothesis is that a state is more likely to develop an emigrant policy (i.e. a policy of
emigration and return migration) towards a population group abroad when that
group’s perceived utility is negative and vice versa. This utility is based on the sending
state’s domestic political economy and foreign policy goals. In the Egyptian case, an
660 emigrant policy did not develop towards those Egyptians in the Arab world but did
develop for those Egyptians in the west.
Beyond a theorisation of sending states’ differentiated engagement policies, this
paper offers a novel account of the debates on emigration within the four decades of
rule under Presidents Sadat and Mubarak. I attempted to bypass the standard
665 perception of post-1970 Egypt as a typical ‘emigration state’ by highlighting two
unexplored aspects that help us better understand its relationship with the west and
with the Arab world. First, that the Egyptian regime’s shift towards a pro-Western
orientation created novel tensions within-state elites both with respect to ‘brain drain’
concerns, as well as with emigrants’ political activism in the west. Second, I underline
670 the extent to which Egyptian ‘temporary’ emigration has been implicated in
solidifying Egypt’s regional role. The regional interplay between migration and
foreign policy can help in better understanding current regional debates—such as the
processes of substituting Arab labour for Asian labour or, more recently, the move
towards nationalising the private sector labour force in the Gulf states. Domestically,
675 this analysis can help explore how new tensions manifested in the post-Mubarak
period. The political engagement and organised protests of Egyptians residing in
Europe and North America throughout the Egyptian ‘Arab Spring’, for instance,
confirm the negative utility that the pre-2011 Egyptian regime ascribed to these
communities, although the 2011 introduction of out-of-country voting for both
680 ‘permanent’ and ‘temporary’ migrants will complicate the distinction between the two
communities in the future.
Ultimately, this article aims to sketch an evolving research agenda regarding the
rationale behind sending states’ selective engagement with emigrant population
groups abroad. At the same time, while the Egyptian case is perfectly correlated,
685 enabling fairly obvious conclusions regarding the utility of specific population groups
over others, other cases might prove more complicated—when, for instance,
a population group is perceived as a foreign policy asset but a political economy
burden abroad or vice versa. Thus, having established through this single-case study
that states do develop two-tier emigrant policies aiming to foster both their economic
690 development and foreign policy agendas, this article paves the way for future research
across multiple cases.
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Notes
[1] This article examines policy during the 1970–2011 period, before the 2011 uprisings brought
700 an end to the military rule that had continued uninterrupted since the 1952 Revolution. As a
legal framework regarding emigration did not emerge until 1970–1971, this article is not
concerned with the 1952–1970 period.
[2] The hypothesis that the nature of the host state’s regime constitutes a causal factor (i.e. Arab
authoritarian regimes versus Western democracies) is problematic. Lebanon, for instance,
705 has traditionally been democratic, but Egyptians there receive a treatment similar to those
working in the Gulf, while, during the cold war, Egyptians in Eastern Europe received equal
attention as those in the USA.
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